



STANDARDS OF RESPONSE COVER AND HEADQUARTERS STAFFING ADEQUACY STUDY

CARPINTERIA-SUMMERLAND FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, CA

VOLUME 1 OF 4 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

July 27, 2016



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VOLUME 1—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Citygate Associates, LLC performed a Standards of Response Cover (Deployment) and Headquarters Staffing Adequacy study for the Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District (District). This study included reviewing the adequacy of the current fire station deployment system and the headquarters staffing to support the agency. This report is presented in four volumes, including this Executive Summary (**Volume 1**) summarizing our findings and recommendations, a Technical Report (**Volume 2**) that includes a Standards of Coverage (deployment) assessment and a headquarters staffing adequacy assessment, an in-depth community risk assessment (**Volume 3**), and a geographic map atlas (**Volume 4**) that displays fire unit travel time coverage.

1.1 POLICY CHOICES FRAMEWORK

As the District Directors understand, there are no mandatory federal or state regulations directing the level of fire service response times and outcomes. The body of regulations on the fire service provides that *if fire services are provided, they must be done so with the safety of the firefighters and citizens in mind*. Historically, the District has made significant investments in its fire services, and as a result, has fire and emergency medical services (EMS) response coverage in the two largest population clusters in the District.

1.2 CITYGATE'S OVERALL OPINIONS ON THE STATE OF THE DISTRICT'S FIRE SERVICES

In brief, Citygate finds that the challenge of providing fire services in the District is similar to that found in many communities: providing an adequate level of fire services within the context of limited fiscal resources, competing needs, growing and aging populations, plus uncertainty surrounding the exact timing of future development. Citygate must state up front that we found that the District's personnel care about their agency and the people they serve. As is true of most agencies after the recession, the District is challenged to balance needs against available revenues. In our opinion, there is no question that the District must identify the additional resources to invest in its fire stations, and slightly increase daily staffing quantity and headquarters staff.

The District is currently meeting some, but not all, of its needs through its own fire response resources. For multiple-unit emergencies, the District is dependent upon using its neighbors in the regional mutual aid system for assistance. As such, the deployment system does *not completely* meet the District's risks to be protected. The coverage for first-due unit response to small emergencies is adequate, but only in the two population clusters at the ends of the District.

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The District does not field enough of its own units for simultaneous incidents or even a serious house fire requiring at least 15 firefighters including a command chief officer.

During three community and Board of Directors listening sessions, Citygate heard comments typical in California communities regarding a desire for good response times balanced against the tax burden. We heard support for the District’s staff, and the need for updated facilities, but done so cost-effectively. We heard support for the District’s residents and businesses to receive equivalent services; all residents should be protected all of the time.

Throughout this report, Citygate makes key findings, and, where appropriate, specific action item recommendations. Overall, there are 49 key findings and 29 specific action item recommendations.

1.3 FIELD OPERATIONS DEPLOYMENT (FIRE STATIONS)

Fire department deployment, simply stated, is about the **speed** and **weight** of the attack. **Speed** calls for first-due, all-risk intervention units (engines, ladder trucks, chief officers for incident command) strategically located across a coverage area. These units are tasked with controlling moderate emergencies, preventing the incident from escalating to second alarm or greater, which unnecessarily depletes a fire department’s resources as multiple requests for service occur. **Weight** is about multiple-unit response for serious emergencies, such as a room and contents structure fire, a multiple-patient incident, a vehicle accident with extrication required, or a heavy rescue incident. In these situations, a sufficient quantity of firefighters must be assembled within a reasonable time frame to safely control the emergency, thereby keeping it from escalating to greater alarms.

In **Volume 2** of this study, Standards of Response Cover and Headquarters Staffing Adequacy Technical Report, Citygate’s analysis of prior response statistics and use of geographic mapping tools reveals that the District has modest, but not completely adequate fire station coverage. The maps provided in **Volume 4** and the corresponding text explanation beginning in **Volume 2** describe in detail the District’s current deployment system performance.

For effective outcomes on serious medical emergencies, and to keep serious, but still-emerging, fires small, Citygate’s best practices-based recommendation is for the first-due fire unit to arrive within 7 minutes of fire dispatch alerting the fire unit, 90% of the time. In the District, the current fire station system cannot provide this coverage along the entire coastal plain where the populations and buildings to be protected are the most significant. However, population drives call for service demand and, while the *District-wide* response time below appears adequate, it only does so as most incidents occur close to the Carpinteria fire station.

Table 1—Call to Arrival Response Time (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance (Table 12 from Volume 2)

Station	2013	2014	2015
District-Wide	08:33	08:18	07:29
Station 1	07:37	07:18	06:56
Station 2	10:30	10:30	10:05

As this study will explain, the size and road network of the District are too large to effectively serve from just two fire station locations. This can be observed in the fire unit travel times, which are higher than a national best practice recommendation of 4 minutes in urban/suburban population density areas:

Table 2—Travel Time Performance (Minutes/Seconds) – 90% Performance (Table 15 from Volume 2)

Station	2013	2014	2015
District-Wide	06:36	06:17	06:50
Station 1	05:42	05:25	06:33
Station 2	08:33	08:28	08:35

The District is not staffed for one serious building fire and two medical calls for service at the same time. The District is dependent on the regional mutual aid response system to deliver serious fire and multiple-incident support. While this coverage exists when needed, it comes with longer-than-needed response times.

1.4 OVERALL DEPLOYMENT EVALUATION

The District serves a diverse land use pattern in an area bisected by open space areas and main roads and drainages with limited crossovers. Population drives service demand, and development brings population. The District’s responses are volume-driven by emergency medical events, but the District also must ensure an effective firefighting force is available even when multiple medical events occur.

For the foreseeable future, the District will need both a first-due firefighting unit and Effective Response Force (First Alarm) coverage in all parts of the District, consistent with current best practices, if the risk of fire is to be limited to only part of the inside of an affected building. While residential fire sprinklers are now included in the national model fire codes, it will be

decades before the existing housing stock will be upgraded or replaced, even if these codes were to be adopted for all new construction.

While the volume of and response to EMS incidents consume much of the District’s attention, all communities need a “stand-by and readily available” firefighting force for when fires break out.

If the District wants to continue in providing the three elements below, and be *less dependent* on mutual aid, the District can slightly increase its deployment plan by fielding a third fire engine at the center of the District:

- ◆ Provide equitable response times to all similar risk neighborhoods
- ◆ Provide for depth of response when multiple incidents occur
- ◆ Provide for a concentration of response forces for high-risk properties.

For its current risks and desired outcomes, the District does not have enough of its own fire engines. Given the low number of building fires annually, the District can continue to request the Santa Barbara City aerial ladder truck when needed. Based on the deployment analysis contained in this study, Citygate makes specific deployment findings and recommendations are listed below. Then the Board can conduct a community conversation about the size, cost, and timing of rebuilding Fire Station 2, adding a third fire station, and updating Fire Station 1.

1.5 OVERALL HEADQUARTERS STAFFING AND FACILITIES EVALUATION

Citygate’s review of headquarters staffing revealed that the Department only has the minimum staff to provide the management and programs required by regulations for even a small fire district. In the near term, one more fire management position is needed, as will be explained in this report. The District has been triaging its headquarters capacity to the programs that deliver day-to-day services first, along with trying to ensure safe, effective operations for the workforce.

During our listening sessions (described in Section 3 of this report), we received many comments that, over the years and across multiple management teams, some aspects of the District’s headquarters services were not at all, or not consistently, performed to published best practices or Cal/OSHA requirements. There are incomplete historical records, and some of these comments could not be validated. Nor was it within the scope of Citygate’s study to conduct a forensic, retrospective audit. However, in Citygate’s experience, what we heard was entirely plausible as small and even large agencies struggle with providing headquarters services to best practices or even OSHA standards. There are a variety of reasons for this, ranging from a lack of needed staff technical skills to not funding enough positions to perform all the work. Citygate reviewed current records and ascertained, through follow-up questions, how the Department is performing at present, as benchmarked to best practices and Cal/OSHA standards.

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We did find the District’s headquarters services strained, and the quality of the services has been inconsistent over a long period. The staff is currently better meeting required safety and operating standards. Citygate’s recommendations are to balance the needs of the emergency operations with the other lines of business in administration, training, and overall personnel management. If the strong economy continues to challenge fire prevention services, contracting out for part-time assistance should be considered before adding back full-time employees.

Citygate finds the District’s facilities in serious and immediate need of repairs, replacement, and enlargement. Fire Station 2 is totally inadequate and needs to be replaced, at first with a temporary facility for employee health and safety. Fire Station 1 is aging and needs appropriate repairs and building code updates.

To improve both first-due and multiple-unit responses to serious emergencies (First Alarm) with less dependence on mutual aid, the District should add a third fire station in the center of the coastal plain. This building and parcel should be sized to include the District’s headquarters staff, training/community meeting room, and a small space for firefighter and apparatus outdoor training.

The Board can revisit, with its communities, the conversation about the size, cost, and timing of rebuilding Fire Station 2, updating Fire Station 1, and adding a third fire station/headquarters facility.

1.6 CONSOLIDATED SERVICES OPTIONS

Small city and special district fire departments have always had to balance having small revenue with the minimum cost of adequate headquarters services. Even with only two staffed fire station per day, there is a need for a minimum management, business services, and fire prevention team to ensure the District is operated within all of the appropriate personnel, business, and safety regulations. A natural question is “Would there be a cost efficiency in merging or contracting fire services to a larger organization?” Doing so could improve the cost-effective delivery of headquarters services, even if the number of firefighters per day remained constant.

In Section 8 of Volume 2 of this study, our Technical Report covers the details and options for merging or contracting fire services.

Given these issues and service provider choices, Citygate would suggest that, if the Carpinteria-Summerland Board of Directors wants to pursue the complete analysis of a merger or full contract for service, the most straightforward way is to ask formally for the County Fire Department to submit a detailed proposal. If the costs seem reasonable, a second step would be the appropriate detail work resulting in an application to LAFCO and the County Board of Supervisors.

If the Carpinteria-Summerland Board of Directors merely wants to benchmark its costs to a consolidated cost, initially including the Montecito Fire Protection District and Santa Barbara Fire Department along with the County, this analysis would be a complex and costly endeavor for the Board. The County's costs will likely be close to the other options and the County, being the largest of the three departments, already has the greatest cost of services scale to offer another agency.

Absent a strong Carpinteria-Summerland Board of Directors and community preference to exit fire services at hopefully the same or less available revenue as today, the remaining path is to implement the recommendations in this study, maintain quality control oversight, and continue to match services to local revenues and community preferences.

1.7 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Citygate's findings and recommendations are organized by topic. For reference purposes, the findings and recommendation numbers refer to the sequential numbers as these are presented in the technical report volume.

1.7.1 Risk Assessment Findings and Recommendations

Citygate's risk assessment findings and recommendations are listed below, beginning with Finding #2 (Finding #1 is presented in Section 1.7.2—Deployment Findings and Recommendations).

Finding #2: Santa Barbara County and the Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District have adopted current California codes with local amendments to minimize the occurrence of building fires and provide for the safety of building occupants.

Finding #3: The District has a good response capability, training program, and pre-incident planning to reduce the severity of building fires.

Finding #4: The engine company inspection program has enhanced the District's Community Risk Reduction efforts.

Finding #5: Neither of the District's fire station facilities conform to the seismic safety requirements of essential services buildings as contained in Chapter 2, Sections 16000-16022 of the California Health and Safety Code.

Finding #6: The District has the appropriate training and response capability to reduce the impact severity of a hazardous material release or spill.

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- Finding #7:** The District has adopted an effective Community Wildfire Protection Plan to reduce its wildland fire risk vulnerability by modifying and/or selectively eliminating dead and decadent vegetation thus reducing vegetative fuel loading and related flammability in heavily vegetated areas of the District.
- Finding #8:** The District has taken some steps to educate residents about, and to enforce state WUI vegetation clearance requirements around buildings; however, there does not appear to be any accountability to ensure that these inspections are completed in a timely manner, and to enforce and correct non-compliance.
- Finding #9:** The District has developed wildland pre-attack plans for the WUI areas of the District to include populations and buildings at risk, travel routes, and response requirements and assignments.
- Recommendation #1:** The District should continue updating its pre-fire plans for commercial, high-risk, critical facility, and other target hazard occupancies at least once every five years.
- Recommendation #2:** The District should consider re-implementing its engine company inspection program, or alternatively hiring additional fire prevention staff, to conduct fire and life safety inspections of all commercial, high-risk, critical facility, and other target hazard occupancies on at least a three-year cycle.
- Recommendation #3:** Absent complete facility replacement(s), the District should consider upgrading its fire station facilities to conform to the seismic safety requirements of essential services buildings as contained in Chapter 2, Sections 16000-16022 of the California Health and Safety Code.
- Recommendation #4:** The District should consider collaborating with the City of Carpinteria and the Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Office to develop a local evacuation/shelter-in-place plan specific to District residents and businesses.
- Recommendation #5:** The District should conduct a tabletop or functional hazardous material release/spill exercise with the Santa Barbara regional Hazardous Materials Response Team at least bi-annually.
- Recommendation #6:** Maintain existing vegetation reduction/modification projects to ensure sustained long-term effectiveness.

- Recommendation #7:** Aggressively seek additional landowner agreements for vegetation removal/modification projects, especially in those areas of the District adjacent to the native chaparral fuel beds.
- Recommendation #8:** Aggressively seek additional neighborhood vegetation removal/reduction projects that will effectively reduce wildland fire intensity/spread potential.
- Recommendation #9:** Aggressively seek additional funding sources to support District CWPP priorities, goals, and objectives.

1.7.2 Deployment Findings and Recommendations

Citygate’s deployment findings and recommendations are listed below. Findings #2 through #9 are presented in Section 1.7.1—Risk Assessment Findings and Recommendations.

- Finding #1:** The District Board of Directors has not adopted a complete and best-practices-based deployment measure or set of specialty response measures for all-risk emergency responses that includes the beginning time measure from the point of the (contracted) Montecito Fire Protection District Communications Center receiving the 9-1-1 phone call, nor a goal statement tied to risks and outcome expectations. The deployment measure should have a second measurement statement to define multiple-unit response coverage for serious emergencies. Making these deployment goal changes will meet the best practice recommendations of the Commission on Fire Accreditation International.
- Finding #10:** Given that all of the populated areas abut high to very high wildfire severity zones, the District needs the “weight” of fire attack, using multiple units in a timely manner, to stop incipient wildfires before they become catastrophic and cannot be controlled in the near term.
- Finding #11:** Most of the coastal areas of the District are close to, or above, suburban population densities. The core of Carpinteria and Summerland are urban. As such, it is appropriate to benchmark the Districts’ response time and outcome goals to that as recommended by National Fire Protection Agency 1710 for career fire departments.
- Finding #12:** The District’s two fire station locations cannot provide 4-minute travel time coverage to suburban population density areas along the coastal plain and developed areas north of Highway 101.

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- Finding #13:** Relocating Station 2 east of Summerland does not provide adequate suburban/urban population density response time coverage in Summerland. The District is large enough to need three fire stations along the coastal plain if the service level policy decision is to provide 4-minute travel time coverage to the most populated neighborhoods in the District.
- Finding #14:** Given only two fire stations with a minimum of nine firefighters on duty, and the mutual aid engines not being close by, only the Summerland area of the District receives a partial First Alarm compliment of three engines and the rescue squad in 8 minutes travel. Carpinteria does not receive more than two fire engines in 8 minutes, and thus does not have timely, effective multiple-unit coverage to serious fires.
- Finding #15:** Given the ladder truck coverage from 10 to greater than 12 minutes, the District does not have timely ladder truck coverage, and it must be considered tactically a Second Alarm, longer response time resource.
- Finding #16:** The District should have a unit distribution plan that provides a third unit to provide simultaneous incident coverage to both ends of the coastal plain in the District.
- Finding #17:** The District’s time-of-day, day-of-week, and month-of-year calls for service demands are very consistent. This means the District needs to operate a fairly consistent 24/7/365 response system.
- Finding #18:** The hourly incident demand by unit, and the rate of simultaneous incidents, are greatest in Station 1’s area. This is troublesome when there is not a closer unit than Station 2 to handle simultaneous incidents in the eastern District. The use of the squad is helpful, and should be continued on a full-time basis.
- Finding #19:** The performance of the Montecito Fire Protection District Communications Center is excellent and better than best practices at the 90% point.
- Finding #20:** The District’s turnout times are better than or close to Citygate’s recommendations, and continued emphasis must be placed on the crews attaining excellent turnout times.
- Finding #21:** The District’s fire station areas are too large, on a very constrained road network, to deliver travel times less than 6 minutes. Some of this is made worse when both Station 1 units are committed to an incident and Station 2 must cover from farther

away. The only way to improve response times is to increase unit availability by properly locating a third unit to support the eastern District and limit the amount of occurrences Station 2 must respond all the way into Carpinteria.

Finding #22: The District’s *travel* time response time for the fourth unit to serious fires, known as the Effective Response Force (ERF or First Alarm) shows that, absent another full firefighting unit located inside the District, the multiple-unit travel times cannot be lowered to suburban or urban best practice recommendations due to the distance outside the District that the mutual aid stations are located.

Recommendation #10: **Adopt Deployment Measures Policies:** The District elected officials should adopt updated, complete performance measures to direct fire crew planning and to monitor the operation of the Department. The measures of time should be designed to save patients where medically possible and to keep small but serious fires from becoming greater alarm fires. With this in mind, Citygate recommends the following measures:

10.1 Distribution of Fire Stations: To treat medical patients and control small fires, the first-due unit should arrive within 7 minutes, 90% of the time from the receipt of the call in the Montecito FPD Communications Center. This equates to a 1-minute dispatch time, a 2-minute company turnout time, and a 4-minute drive time in the most populated areas.

10.2 Multiple-Unit Effective Response Force for Serious Emergencies: To confine fires near the room of origin, to stop wildland fires to under three acres when noticed promptly, and to treat up to five medical patients at once, a multiple-unit response of a *minimum* of three District engines *plus* one from mutual aid and one Battalion Chief totaling 13 personnel should arrive within 11:00 minutes from the time of 9-1-1 call receipt in fire dispatch, 90% of the time. This equates to a 1-minute dispatch time, 2-minute company turnout time, and 8-minute drive time spacing for multiple units in the most populated areas.

10.3 Hazardous Materials Response: Provide hazardous materials response designed to protect the community from the hazards associated with uncontrolled release of hazardous and toxic

materials. The fundamental mission of the District response is to minimize or halt the release of a hazardous substance so it has minimal impact on the community. It can achieve this with a travel time for the first company capable of investigating a HazMat release at the operations level within 6 minutes travel time or less than 90% of the time. After size-up and scene evaluation is completed, a determination will be made whether to request additional resources from the District's multiple-agency hazardous materials response partnership.

10.4 Technical Rescue: Respond to technical rescue emergencies as efficiently and effectively as possible with enough trained personnel to facilitate a successful rescue. Achieve a travel time for the first company in for size-up of the rescue within 6 minutes travel time or less 90% of the time. Assemble additional resources for technical rescue capable of initiating a rescue within a total response time of 11 minutes, 90% of the time. Safely complete rescue/extrication to ensure delivery of patient to a definitive care facility.

10.5 Emergency Medical Services: The District should continue to continue to provide first responder medical services to all neighborhoods.

Recommendation #11: The District needs to maintain acceptable fire crew turnout times for all crews at all stations.

Recommendation #12: The District should totally replace Fire Station 2 at a location near the current location in the middle of the Summerland area.

Recommendation #13: As revenues allow, the District should add a third fire station with a three-person fire engine at a location near the I-101 and Via Real.

Recommendation #14: If the parcel and financing for the third fire station can be identified, Citygate would offer this advice on the programming and priority of facility improvements:

14.1 Rebuild Station 2 as soon as possible. Its size should be reduced to that of a single company fire station, allowing for one reserve apparatus. The training/community room and other expansive spaces can be eliminated.

14.2 Acquire a parcel for a third fire station in the middle of the District. If land space and economics allow, this station should have a training room, reserve apparatus space, and modest outdoor space for training. If revenues further support, the District’s headquarters spaces could be added to this facility, in place of leasing space office space in business parks, where the staff is separated from fire crews and there is limited fire engine parking for meetings.

14.3 As revenues allow, upgrade and repair Fire Station 1 to current seismic requirements, fire crew needs, and California Essential Facility Act requirements.

1.7.3 Headquarters and Support Services Findings and Recommendations

Citygate’s headquarters services findings and recommendations are listed below.

Finding #23: The Department’s management organization is under-sized to effectively address current and anticipated future workloads.

Finding #24: The Fire Prevention Bureau is staffed to meet the minimum needs of a fire district of the District’s size and needs.

Finding #25: The Fire Prevention Bureau does not have adequate record keeping systems to track and schedule work demands, nor the office support staff to grow permit programs.

Finding #26: While not managed by a full-time training officer, the District’s training program is designed to and attempts to meet current recommended annual training best practices. The program also depends on the line Fire Captains to assist the shift-based Battalion Chief. This training program design is typical in smaller departments, and can meet the needs of the District when given the proper oversight to ensure quality and compliance to safety standards.

Finding #27: The District’s Injury and Illness Prevention Program, last updated in 2014, does not specifically address many of the elements required by Cal/OSHA for high-hazard employers.

Finding #28: Health and Safety Committee meetings are not conducted at least quarterly as required by the District’s Injury and Illness Prevention Program.

- Finding #29:** The design of EMS oversight for the District’s EMTs and paramedics is typical and, at present, barely sufficient for the number of personnel and quantity of emergencies. If the staff cannot keep up with the quality assurance program, a common solution is to partner with other small agencies and share the cost of another EMS technical oversight position.
- Finding #30:** District fire apparatus and support vehicles are in good to excellent condition, appropriately maintained, and well suited and properly equipped to respond to expected risks.
- Finding #31:** The District’s current vehicle inspection and maintenance programs and services conform to NFPA, California Vehicle Code, and Department of Transportation standards. This was not always so in the past and should not be allowed to slip again.
- Finding #32:** The District conducts annual tests of apparatus fire pumps in conformance with NFPA 1911 *Standard for the Inspection, Maintenance, Testing, and Retirement of In-Service Automotive Fire Apparatus*.
- Finding #33:** The District has a restricted fiscal reserve account to fund replacement of capital fire apparatus and support vehicles.
- Finding #34:** District fire ladders were tested in 2016 in conformance with nationally recognized testing standards; however, no prior test records were available or provided.
- Finding #35:** The District tests its fire hose annually in accordance with the annual testing requirements of NFPA 1962 *Standard for the Care, Use, Inspection, Service Testing, and Replacement of Fire Hose, Couplings, Nozzles, and Fire Hose Appliances*.
- Finding #36:** Although gaps exist for some prior years, District self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are currently tested annually by a qualified District SCBA Technician in conformance with nationally recognized standards.
- Recommendation #15:** The headquarters team should be increased with one staff Fire Captain on a 40-hour week schedule to increase administrative capacity and provide depth for succession planning and long-term absence relief.

- Recommendation #16:** The Fire Chief and Fire Prevention Bureau need to internally triage inspection and program priorities on a multiple-year rotational basis to accomplish mandated inspections and wildland fuel management.
- Recommendation #17:** Fire Prevention routine inspections and public education can continue to be handled by the fire crews.
- Recommendation #18:** When the economy is growing as at present, the District would be better off not hiring more permanent staff, but to contract out plan check, and even complex inspections, to private sector companies and charge the appropriate fees to the applicant to cover the costs. Many smaller cities do this, including Carpinteria.

1.7.4 Facility Findings and Recommendations

Citygate’s facility findings and recommendations are listed below.

- Finding #37:** The District’s self-contained breathing apparatus air compressor is currently tested quarterly for air quality in conformance with nationally recognized standards, although testing was not conducted consistently as required in previous years.
- Finding #38:** The Montecito Fire Protection District Communications Center consistently performs better than nationally recognized emergency call processing and dispatch performance standards.
- Finding #39:** As the deployment analysis identified, Fire Station 1 has good access to the eastern areas of the District and, as such, this site should continue to be used as a fire station.
- Finding #40:** Fire Station 1 does not conform to the seismic safety requirements of the Essential Services Building Seismic Safety Act of 1986 (Health and Safety Code Section 16000-16022).
- Finding #41:** Fire Station 1 has ongoing electrical and plumbing problems, as well as other general building maintenance issues related to the facility’s age and heavy daily use.
- Finding #42:** As the deployment analysis identified, Fire Station 2 has good access to the western areas of the District.

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Finding #43: Fire Station 2 lacks adequate secured indoor parking space for the assigned vehicles.

Finding #44: Fire Station 2 lacks gender-separate bathroom facilities and sleeping areas.

Finding #45: Fire Station 2 does not conform to the seismic safety requirements of the Essential Services Building Seismic Safety Act of 1986 (Health and Safety Code Section 16000-16022).

Finding #46: Fire apparatus parked in the front driveway of Fire Station 2 block the public sidewalk due to insufficient driveway depth.

Finding #47: Fire Station 2 abuts the CalTrans right-of-way for northbound U.S. 101, presenting a significant noise and safety hazard for assigned District personnel.

Finding #48: Fire Station 2 is in poor condition due to its age and ongoing termite damage. It is no longer suitable or cost-effectively repairable for ongoing use as fire crew living space 24/7/365.

Finding #49: The District’s leased headquarters office space is cramped, and the leased building is not built to California Essential Facility Act Standards. The building also serves as the disaster plan Emergency Operations Center for Carpinteria.

Recommendation #19: The District should consider updating its Injury and Illness Prevention Program to address all of elements required by Cal/OSHA for high-hazard employers.

Recommendation #20: The District should schedule and conduct Health and Safety Committee meetings at least quarterly in conformance with its Injury and Illness Prevention Program.

Recommendation #21: The District must ensure that all ground ladders are tested annually in conformance with nationally recognized testing standards, and that test records are maintained for each ladder for the duration of its service life.

Recommendation #22: The District must ensure that all self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are tested annually in conformance with nationally recognized testing standards, and that compressed air cylinders are tested as required by the Federal Department of Transportation regulations.

- Recommendation #23:** The District must ensure that its breathing apparatus air compressor is tested quarterly for air quality in conformance with nationally recognized standards.
- Recommendation #24:** Replace and slightly relocate Fire Station 2 in Summerland as tested in the deployment study. The building in all aspects is inadequate and the parcel too small to continue to invest in repairs.
- Recommendation #25:** Fire Station 2 presents potential employee health and safety issues. If a temporary facility can be identified in Summerland, the fire crew should be moved as soon as possible while funding, design, and construction occur for a permanent replacement.
- Recommendation #26:** Permanent Fire Station 2 should be sized for a single fire crew with one firefighting unit and one reserve apparatus. The primary fire apparatus should be designed for the topography of the Summerland section of the District. Meeting, training, and other spaces should be located at a third fire station in the central District.
- Recommendation #27:** Fire Station 1 requires Essential Facility Act and other repairs for its long-term use and these repairs should be the second facility priority of the District.
- Recommendation #28:** If funds can be identified to staff a third fire engine, the District should consider a location close to the middle of the District as tested in the deployment study.
- Recommendation #29:** A third fire station in the central District should also contain adequate space for the headquarters personnel, a training/community room, and small outdoor space for hands-on training of the District’s firefighters.

1.8 NEXT STEPS

The purpose of this assessment is to compare the District’s current performance against the local risks to be protected, as well as to compare against nationally recognized best practices. This analysis of performance forms the base from which to make recommendations for changes, if any, in fire station locations, equipment types, staffing, and headquarters programs.

As one step, the District Board of Directors should adopt updated and best practices based response time goals for the District and provide accountability for the District personnel to meet those standards. The goals identified in Recommendation #10 meet national best practices.

Measurement and planning as the District continues to evolve will be necessary for the District to meet these goals. Citygate recommends that the District’s next steps be to work through the issues identified in this study over the following time lines:

1.8.1 Short-Term Steps

- ◆ Absorb the policy recommendations of this fire services study and adopt updated District performance measures to drive the deployment of firefighting and emergency medical resources.
- ◆ Consider requesting a services merger proposal from the Santa Barbara County Fire Department.
- ◆ Identify funding and timing for a full third crew.
- ◆ Identify funding and timing for three major facility projects in this priority order:
 - Temporary Fire Station 2
 - Permanent Fire Station 2
 - Repairs of Fire Station 1
 - New Fire Station 3

1.8.2 Ongoing Steps

- ◆ Monitor the headquarters staff workload and, as capacity is exceeded, a best practice is to use part-time or contract employees to deliver expanded services due to economic upswing-driven workload increases. If the workload increase is permanent and not part of a temporary upswing, then the addition of permanent staff must be considered.